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Incest 2 (1970)
The Colt family incest case concerns an Australian family discovered in 2012 to have been engaging in four generations of incest beginning with a couple known as Tim and June Colt, who emigrated from New Zealand in the 1970s. They all lived on a farm near Boorowa, New South Wales.[1][2] The family members' true identities remain unknown to the public. The name "Colt" is a pseudonym used by New South Wales courts and government agencies, as are all of the family's given names.
Incest 2 (1970)
"June", born in 1948, and "Tim Colt", born in 1943, were originally from New Zealand. June, who was the product of brother-sister incest, married Tim in 1966. The couple had seven children together: Martha, Frank, Paula, Cherry, Rhonda, Betty, and Charlie, before moving to Victoria in the 1970s.[1] Tim Colt began to rape Betty when she was 12. In 1997, Betty, wanting to know if June could donate a kidney to a granddaughter, found out that her mother June was inbred.[3]
The family grew to nearly forty members ranging from grandparents to mothers, fathers, sons, daughters, aunts, uncles, nephews, brothers and sisters, all engaging in various forms of incest. Many of the children suffered from deformities and medical problems. School attendance was transient and happened only when welfare officers visited the family, and children needed remedial teaching once there. Some children tortured animals, mutilating their genitals, as a pastime.[1]
Over the next year, police tracked the family down and, after obtaining an understanding of the living conditions in the family's encampment, put several children in foster care, including Bobby (Betty's son with her younger brother) and Billy (Betty's son with her older son). Police discovered the living area of thirty-eight members of the family in the bush, living under squalid conditions in tents and shacks, on the outskirts of Boorowa. The family were charged with incest and child neglect.[2]
Betty Colt legally disputed the charges and attempted to regain custody. After tracking the cell phone activities of Betty, police discovered text messages of a sexual nature sent to her son, Bobby. She and Bobby had made plans to abduct Billy from foster care. Genetic testing showed that Bobby was the product of incest between Betty and a father or full brother.[10]
Although legal abortions were largely unavailable until the years just before Roe, some women were always able to obtain the necessary approval for an abortion under the requirements of their state law. In most states, until just before 1973, this meant demonstrating that a woman's life would be endangered if she carried her pregnancy to term. In some states, especially between 1967 and 1973, a woman also could receive approval for an abortion if it were deemed necessary to protect her physical or mental health, or if the pregnancy had resulted from rape or incest.
In 1967, Colorado became the first state to reform its abortion law based on the ALI recommendation. The new Colorado statute permitted abortions if the pregnant woman's life or physical or mental health were endangered, if the fetus would be born with a severe physical or mental defect, or if the pregnancy had resulted from rape or incest. Other states began to follow suit, and by 1972, 13 states had so-called ALI statutes. Meanwhile, four states repealed their antiabortion laws completely, substituting statutes permitting abortions that were judged to be necessary by a woman and her physician (see map). By 1973, when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Roe, abortion reform legislation had been introduced in all but five states.
Within the past two years, we have encountered two cases where homosexual incest seemed to be a potent predisposing factor in extreme pathological behavior. In order to better understand what we were contending with, an extensive search and review of the literature was undertaken and the two case histories analyzed in detail. Our conclusions include:(1) that homosexual incest is at times unrecognized by therapists and therefore not dealt with to alleviate torment and sometimes to avert tragic consequences; and(2) that it is underreported so that information is lacking and essential dialogue on dynamics and treatment rarely occurs. It is hoped that this article will stimulate awareness of the phenomenon and foster exchange of ideas regarding etiology, psychodynamics, and intervention.
Thus, this seemingly universal prohibition that sustains moral order in the world is nothing of the sort. Incest prohibitions, in other words, change over time and express different social and cultural meanings when they do. Perhaps for us, the horror and disgust of incest serve to assure us that in these troubled times of relativism there is at least one thing, across cultures and epochs, that we can rely on.
But that sentiment and effusion are still with us now. This is because the modern subject, the individual whose political relevance both the right and the left, though in different ways, extoll, is fundamentally conditioned by the bourgeois family. The bourgeois family cannot be the site of intimacy that it is without the hovering threat of incest; thus, the modern individual, too, is never free from the threat of incest. And it is this complicated relation to the eroticized family that contemporary axioms of disgust repress.
That his life of crime ends when he accidentally seduces his younger sister, whom he had not seen for 15 years, brings us to the current controversy in New Jersey. Why was it that Jennings was willing to do anything, but not incest? The revelation that the sex of the family finds you, even years after you have left your family behind, was, apparently, too much to bear for Jennings.
Unlike most states that followed, Michigan repealed its criminal incest statute in its entirety. New Jersey was one of the few states to follow suit, effectively decriminalizing adult consensual incest. This was perhaps the most radical effect (concerning incest) of rape reform legislation, but it was limited to just a few states. More states decriminalized consenting sexual activity between teenage relatives, provided the age gap was no more than three to four years, effectively legalizing brother-sister incest, at least for a short period of time. This situation remains in effect in several states, joined in 1989 by Rhode Island, which repealed all of its criminal incest laws (leaving the civil marriage prohibitions intact).
The absence of a ban on adult consensual incest, however revolting some might find it, is not an anomaly but the effect of the eroticized bourgeois family and liberal individual, both of which have been with us for more than two centuries. As states like New Jersey, Michigan, and Rhode Island decriminalize consensual adult incest, as the German Ethics Council claims incest is a fundamental right of the individual, as New York Times columnists speculate openly about the potentially incestuous quality of familial affection, we have to confront the fact that incest is, perhaps, becoming something new. If this is the case, it is not without precedent. Incest, I have been arguing, always has to be understood in its historical context. And our current context makes its own demands on what we expect the family to be, and not be.
On March 11, 1970, appellant filed an information charging respondent with two counts of statutory rape and two counts of incest. The alleged victims are his two daughters. The information, as subsequently amended, charges acts committed on December 11, 1966, November 17, 1967, and December 11, 1967, when the victims were 12 and 13 years of age. On [20 Cal. App. 3d 893] July 3, 1970, respondent filed two essentially identical motions each seeking an order of the trial court requiring that the identified complaining witness "be required to present herself ... for a psychiatric examination at the defendant's expense by a psychiatrist to be selected by the defendant to examine into her mental condition prior to trial. ..." Respondent's declarations filed in support of the motions state in effect that the charges against him by his two daughters were first made in 1969 after respondent had returned from an overseas assignment in Thailand and bitter marital discord, resulting in a contested divorce proceeding, had developed between respondent and the mother of the complaining witnesses. The declaration also recites conduct of the complaining witnesses in the interim inconsistent with the charges made by them.
[3] Here the record discloses a factual basis which supports the exercise of discretion by the trial judge in a manner ordering psychiatric examinations. Two to three years had intervened from the time of the alleged acts of incest and statutory rape until the victims complained of them. In the intervening period, a bitter domestic dispute developed between respondent and the mother of the alleged victims. The complaining witnesses were of an age where that dispute between their parents could have had a profound emotional effect upon them. The charges made by the complaining witnesses are essentially uncorroborated. Under those circumstances, it cannot be said on appeal that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding a compelling reason for a psychiatric examination.
The Hyde Amendment is a discriminatory and racist policy that prevents federal dollars from being used in government insurance programs like Medicaid for abortion services (except in instances of incest, rape, or life-threatening risk to the pregnant person).
Summary: This report reviews available statistics regarding reasons given for obtaining abortions in the United States, including surveys by the Alan Guttmacher Institute and data from seven state health/statistics agencies that report relevant statistics (Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Utah). The official data imply that AGI claims regarding "hard case" abortions are inflated by roughly a factor of three. Actual percentage of U.S. abortions in "hard cases" are estimated as follows: in cases of rape, 0.3%; in cases of incest, 0.03%; in cases of risk to maternal life, 0.1%; in cases of risk to maternal health, 0.8%; and in cases of fetal health issues, 0.5%. About 98.3% of abortions in the United States are elective, including socio-economic reasons or for birth control. This includes perhaps 30% for primarily economic reasons and possibly 0.1% each for sex selection and selective reduction of multifetal pregnancies. 041b061a72